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Abstract: Power system robustness against overload condition is a challenging issue in the fields of power system
planning and operation. In this paper, two indices are proposed to evaluate power system robustness. The proposed
indices are used to identify critical lines whose failure is due to overload, leading the power system to cascading outages
and blackout. The first proposed index is a linear index. The second index is based on graph theory metrics. To prevent
cascading outages, system robustness is calculated for all N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies. The lines whose outages
lead to the smallest robustness values are considered as critical lines. The proposed indices are validated by applying to
the IEEE 118-bus test system. Simulation results demonstrate the capability of both indices in identifying critical lines.
Therefore, the purposed indices could be used as a reliable metric to apply preventive actions against possible cascading
outages and blackouts.
Key words: Blackout, cascading failure, power system robustness, graph theory

1. Introduction
Despite great progress in the operation, control, and protection of power systems, the number of blackouts has
increased dramatically. Due to the increasing demand for electricity and high penetration of renewable energy
on one hand and the lack of sufficient expansion of transmission system owing to economic concerns on the other
hand, much power system equipment and especially transmission lines are operated close to their maximum
operation constraints [1]. Hence, a power system is exposed to serious overloads that decrease system robustness
and security. Overloads cause cascading outages, which may lead a power system to large-scale blackout [1].
Detailed study of recent blackouts reveals that, generally, blackouts are triggered by an initial event, especially
line outage. In other words, line tripping is a regular starting point of widespread blackouts. Subsequent events
like misoperation of operators or protection system and load restoration can lead to further outages such as
transmission line outages or generator outages [2]. Following the initial event in a heavily loaded system, power
flow of the disconnected line is redistributed in the system and causes other lines to get overloaded. During
overload conditions, the impedance trajectory may encroach on the 3rd zone of distance relays and, therefore,
some crucial transmission lines are undesirably disconnected. This process is repeated and leads to cascading
outages and blackouts [3–7]. Therefore, power system robustness should be determined to identify contingencies
that the system must be secured against [8].
Recently, there has been great effort to simulate cascading outages and blackouts. The OPA model
considers two fast and slow iterative dynamic processes for cascading outage simulation [9–13]. OPA stands
for Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Power Systems Engineering Research Center at the University of
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Wisconsin and University of Alaska to indicate the institutions collaborating to devise the simulation. In
the case of overload, linear programming-based generation rescheduling and load shedding is applied. The
branching process method proposes a probabilistic distribution function to determine the size of the blackout.
This model gives the number of disconnected lines, as well as the amount of dropped load in each generation.
However, it does not introduce any information about the mechanism of outages such as how, why, and which
line is disconnected [14–19]. TRELSS, a computer program for transmission reliability evaluation of large-scale
systems, evaluates the probabilistic reliability of the system. This computer program captures a cascading path
starting from an aggravated system condition and initiating event [20, 21]. The stochastic model simulates
all events randomly. In the case of overload alleviation, linear programing is used for generation rescheduling
[22]. The newly proposed interaction model tries to evaluate components’ failures impacts on each other. This
model is too complicated and also time-consuming since it needs results of the OPA model [23]. Recently there
has been great effort to study cascading outages of power systems as a complex network, based on structural
properties [24–28]. In this method, the system is modeled as a graph with edges and nodes. The main objective
of this model is to evaluate system robustness against cascading outages and blackouts, considering structural
properties. The effect of load redistribution on system robustness was evaluated in [29, 30]. In this method,
system load is assumed to be dependent on the node degree and number of nodes connected to the special node,
while in the power system loads are independent of structure and are specified by users. The effect of node
capacity on system robustness was studied in [31–36]. These works present the cascading outage of nodes as
the main cause of blackouts and node capacity enlargement as a preventive action. However, bus triggering is
a rare event in power systems and has been studied scarcely. In the meantime, transmission expansion is only
possible by constructing new transmission lines, which is not applicable in short-term studies. The effect of
loading level on system robustness was presented in [37]. In order to prevent cascading outages, loads of nodes
encountering overload are transmitted to neighboring nodes, while in a power system, lines play this role. On
top of that, transmitting the loads between bus bars is impossible in a power system. The criteria proposed for
robustness calculation are not only structure-based, but also independent of power flow equations. Despite the
mentioned differences, one remarkable feature of this model is its ability to calculate system robustness. This
ability helps find nodes whose outages trigger cascading outages and blackouts.
The main objective of this paper is to present two indices for evaluating system robustness. The system
robustness for normal, N − 1 , and N − 2 contingencies is calculated using the indices. The lines whose outages
decrease system robustness below the threshold value are considered as critical lines. The time domain analysis
is performed in DigSILENT PowerFactory software and verifies the ability of the proposed indices in identifying
the critical lines. Therefore, the purposed indices could be used as a reliable metric to apply preventive actions
against possible cascading outages and blackouts. The proposed indices are applied to the IEEE 118-bus test
system to demonstrate the performance of indices in large-scale systems. This test system has been used in
many well-known publications in the field of power system operation and planning [38–41]. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed indices for robustness evaluation. Simulation
results are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, a discussion on the proposed indices is presented. Finally, the
conclusion is drawn in Section 5.
2. Evaluation of robustness
The scope of this paper is focused on identifying crucial transmission lines whose failure exposes the remaining
lines to overload. Identification of these lines is performed by calculating power system robustness in all N − 1
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Figure 1. The schematic of designated weight.

and N − 2 contingencies. Two indices are proposed for robustness calculation. The first index is a linear index.
The second index is based on graph theory metrics. The proposed indices are evaluated as follows.
2.1. Robustness evaluation by linear index
The first index is calculated by a simple linear equation. The linear equation assigns a special weight to each
line based on its loading level. Once the weights are calculated for each transmission line, the linear index is
evaluated by summing all weights. Transmitted power on transmission lines changes due to topological changes
such as line failure or generating unit outages. Regularly, power flow of the disconnected line is transmitted
to its adjacent lines and increases their loading. In large-scale systems, while power flow increases in some
transmission lines, it may decrease in some others. This issue results in misestimation of methods that use
cumulative loading as a measure for overload estimation. Therefore, the proposed index should be able to
recognize even fractional overload and should not be affected by power flow redistribution. Hence, the proposed
linear index should introduce the following features:
1. The index should be able to recognize overload state in an L-line system when L − 1 lines are loaded at
minimum, while the remaining one is at excessive level.
2. The index should be able to identify the normal state of the system while all lines are heavily loaded but
there is no overloaded one.
These two features illustrate the importance of allocated weight to the lines. The designated weight is
derived by Eq. (1), as depicted in Figure 1. According to the figure, if the normalized difference between rated
and actual apparent powers is smaller than the predefined security margin, the left axis line is used for weight
designation. Otherwise, the right axis line is used.

ω(l) =

{ S
(l)−S(l)
+c
a rated
Srated (l)

(l)−S(l)
a′ Srated
+ c′
Srated (l)

if
if

Srated (l)−S(l)
>b
Srated (l)
Srated (l)−S(l)
<b
Srated (l)

(1)

Here, ω(l) is the assigned weight to line l ; a , a′ and c, c′ are slopes and intercepts of the linear equations,
respectively. b is the predefined security margin. Srated (l) and S(l) stand for the rated and actual apparent
powers of line l , respectively.
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Once the weights are calculated, the linear index is evaluated by summing the weights according to Eq.
(2).
LinearIndex =

L
∑

(2)

ω(l)

l=1

Here, l is the line number and L is the total number of lines in the system.
In this trend, if there is an overloaded line in the system, the linear index would be a large positive value;
otherwise, it would be a small negative value. The unknown parameters a, a′ , c, and c′ are selected such
that they meet the mentioned features. Features 1 and 2 are mathematically expressed by Eqs. (3) and (4),
respectively.
LinearIndex|1st f eature = 1 × a′ (b − ε) + c′ + (L − 1) × (a

Srated − Smin
+ c) > 0
Srated

LinearIndex|2nd f eature = L × (ab + c) < 0

(3)

(4)

Here, 1 × a′ (b − ε) + c′ expresses the fractional overload of only one transmission line and the term
−Smin
(L − 1) × (a Srated
+ c) indicates that L − 1 lines are loaded at the minimum loading level.
Srated

Loading of the least loaded line is defined as the minimum loading level. Since there is one overloaded
line in the system, the index should be a positive value. Smin deals with the minimum loading level of line.
ε is the fractional overload of the line expressed by Eq. (5). Eq. (4) indicates that all lines are loaded at the
maximum level and there is no overloaded line. Therefore, the index should be a negative value.
ε = kb

(5)

Here, k is a small value within the (0, 1) range.
Since even a fractional overload should be identified, a′ should be much greater than a. Therefore, the
relationship between a and a′ is defined as below.
a′ = Ka

(6)

Here, K is a large positive value. By substituting Eqs. (5) and (6) in Eq. (3), it is rewritten as Eq. (7).
Kab(1 − k) + (L − 1)(a

Srated − Smin
) + c′ + (L − 1)c > 0
Srated

(7)

Here, K , k , a, and b are user-defined parameters.
Once user-defined parameters a and b are applied to Eq. (3), a proper range for c is obtained. Using
the chosen value for c and applying it to Eq. (7), an interval to select an appropriate value for c′ is achieved.
In this manner, the unknown parameters of Eq. (3) are calculated in accordance with the requirements of the
mentioned features. As the system loading increases, the linear index increases, as well. Hence, the system’s
capability to prevent cascading failures decreases. This issue illustrates the inverse relationship between the
linear index and system robustness.
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2.2. Robustness evaluation by graph theory metric
In graph theory, systems are represented as a network by G(N, L) , where N represents the number of nodes
(buses in power system) and L represents the number of branches (transmission lines and transformers in the
power system). In a graph, interconnection of nodes is represented by an adjacency matrix, which is a symmetric
N × N matrix. The adjacency matrix just represents the existence of connection between nodes and gives no
information on the number of links between nodes or strength of links. The weighted adjacency matrix, W ,
assigns a special weight to each of the nonzero elements of the adjacency matrix. The allocated weight to each
link, wij , could be distance, cost, delay, or strength.
In order to study the graph robustness against cascading outage, a Laplacian matrix, Q , is utilized [42].
The elements of the Laplacian matrix are computed using the weighted adjacency matrix and diagonal matrix,
∆ . The elements of the diagonal matrix are nonzero and computed by summing up the associated elements of
each row of the weighted adjacency matrix as follows.

δii =

N
∑

wij

(8)

i=1

Here, δii are the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix.
The Laplacian matrix is computed by means of the weighted adjacency matrix and diagonal matrix as
below.
Q=∆−W

(9)

Eventually, elements of Laplacian matrix are figured by Eq. (10).


i=j
δij
Qij = −wij i =
̸ j


0
else

(10)

The eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix give important information on system robustness against cascading outages. Since the sum of all elements in each row is zero, all of its eigenvalues are positive except the
smallest one, which is zero. Effective graph resistance (EGR), one of the graph theory metrics for calculating
system topological robustness, is derived by eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix according to Eq. (12). The
eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix and EGR are represented by Eqs. (11) and (12), respectively.
µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ ... ≥ µN −1 ≥ µN

RG = N

N
−1
∑
i=1

1
µi

(11)

(12)

Here, RG and µi are EGR and the eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix, respectively.
The EGR gives important information about the system’s topological robustness against cascading
outages. A small value of EGR represents the immunity of the system against cascading outage, while a
large value denotes its vulnerability.
If the system response to an initial event leads to overload of other transmission lines, the overloaded
lines are exposed to failure. As the number of disconnected lines is increased, integrity of the power system
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is jeopardized and the system faces cascading outages and blackouts. Since the power system obeys Kirchhoff
laws, the robustness calculation needs to consider fundamental rules of the power system. However, EGR just
considers topological features of the system and its application in robustness evaluation needs to apply electrical
rules to the topological features. To achieve this goal, a weight proportional to the apparent power of the lines is
assigned to them. As the lines’ loading exceeds the rated power, it becomes weak and vulnerable. To illustrate
its weakness, the allocated weight should decrease as its apparent power exceeds its rated power. In this work,
the elements of the weighted adjacency matrix are defined as in Eq. (13).

wij =


1

 a Srated (l)−S(l) +c+Z
Srated (l)

1

 a′ Srated (l)−S(l) +c′ +Z

if

Srated (l)−S(l)
Srated (l)

>b

otherwise

(13)

Srated (l)

Here, wij indicates the weight of line l , located between buses i and j .
According to Eq. (13), the allocated weight is the inverse of the designated weight by the linear index.
The only difference is associated with the existence of Z . As mentioned earlier, the elements of W should be
positive values. However, the linear index assigns a large positive value to the lines whose normalized differences
are smaller than the predefined security margin; otherwise, it gives a small negative value. In order to satisfy the
requirement of W , the linear equation should be shifted above the x-axis. This goal is achieved by introducing
Z into Eq. (13). Once the parameters of the linear index are calculated, the value of the linear equation for
S(l) = Smin is evaluated. Since the difference between rated apparent power and actual power is greater than
the predefined security margin, the linear equation would be negative. To shift the linear equation above the
x-axis, the absolute of the evaluated value is selected as Z . Once the weighted adjacency matrix is calculated,
diagonal and Laplacian matrices are derived using Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively.
In this trend, if the line is overloaded, its weight would be a small positive value close to zero, which
indicates its vulnerability. Otherwise, it would be a positive value close to 1 that indicates its immunity against
overload. In this manner, the EGR could be used as an index to study system robustness since electrical rules
are applied to the topological features.
3. Simulation results
In order to apply the proposed robustness indices, the IEEE 118-bus test system is used as depicted in Figure
2. The IEEE 118-bus test system represents a simple approximation of the American electric power system (in
the Midwest USA) as of December 1962. The IEEE 118-bus system contains 19 generators, 35 synchronous
condensers, 176 lines, 10 transformers, and 91 loads. The AC power flow simulations and robustness calculations
are accomplished in the DigSILENT/PowerFactory and MATLAB environments, respectively.
3.1. Robustness evaluation in N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies
In order to identify critical lines whose outages initiate cascading failure and blackout, system robustness
is calculated for all N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies. The failures with the smallest robustness values are
considered as the critical contingencies. The flowchart of critical line identification for N − 1 contingencies,
using the proposed EGR and linear index, is depicted in Figures 3a and 3b, respectively. As shown in Figures
3a and 3b, steps 1 through 4 are the same in both methods. Initially, both flowcharts calculate the system’s
initial state. Following an N − 1 contingency, Ybus of the system is updated and the apparent powers of the
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Figure 2. Diagram of IEEE 118-bus test system.

lines are evaluated. The linear index is evaluated by Eq. (2) for outage of line i . As previously mentioned
in Section 2.1, the overloaded lines are given a positive weight but others are given a negative one. The zero
that discriminates overloaded and nonoverloaded lines acts as a threshold for the linear index. Failures with
positive index able to cause cascading failures are saved in the critical list but others with negative values are
categorized as safe contingencies. Critical lines’ identification by EGR requires the definition of a threshold.
The threshold value is evaluated by computing the EGR index while all lines are loaded at their maximum level,
i.e. 99.99%, and there is no overloaded line. The EGR threshold calculation steps are shown in Figure 3a. As
depicted in Figure 3a, after evaluating the EGR for outage of line i, it is compared with the threshold of the
EGR. If the EGR is greater than the threshold value, the outage is considered as a critical outage; otherwise, it
is categorized in the safe list. In order to identify the critical lines using the linear index, a similar procedure is
applied considering zero as the threshold, which is shown in Figure 3b. Therefore, once N − 1 contingencies are
simulated and related indices are evaluated, the contingencies are sorted based on the indices’ values. Finally,
the process ends with identification of critical lines.
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Figure 3. The flowchart of the critical line identification for N − 1 contingencies: (a) critical line identification by EGR
index; (b) critical line identification by linear index.

Simulation results for the normal state and all N − 1 contingencies, based on linear and EGR indices, are
depicted in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Due to space limitation, just the worst 20 failures are shown. According
to the results, the threshold value for linear and EGR indices are equal to zero and 11.0884, respectively. The
linear and EGR indices for the system’s normal state are equal to -16.967 and 2.122, respectively. The large gap
between the threshold and normal state values declares the nonexistence of a heavily loaded line in the normal
state, which is in accordance with the simulation results in DigSILENT PowerFactory.
According to Figure 4 and Figure 5, among all N − 1 contingencies, just failure of line 26-30, shown
by black bar, exposes the system to overload. The linear and EGR indices for other failures, shown by gray
bars, are the same as normal state values. In other words, these contingencies cause no danger to the system’s
security. Both linear and EGR indices give the same result in identifying the critical line. However, the linear
and EGR indices specify different rankings for the rest of the failures. Since these failures do not threaten
system security, the difference is negligible.
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Figure 4. Linear index for N − 1 contingencies.
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0
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23-24 103-110 69-70 77-82 69-75 92-89 34-43 22-23 44-45 42-49 43-44

77-69 23-32 25-27

77-76 77-75

Disconneted Line
Figure 5. EGR index for N − 1 contingencies.

(
For a system with 176 lines, there are

176
2

)
= 15400 second order outages. Among these outages, a

small number of failures lead to overload. Simulation results of all overloaded N − 2 contingencies based on
linear and EGR indices are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, respectively. According to the figures, both metrics
give the same result in identifying the worst five N − 2 contingencies. Summary of N − 2 contingencies is
presented in Tables 1 and 2. The first and second dangerous failures are cascading outages of lines (26-30, then
25-27) and (26-30, then 23-25), respectively.
In N − 1 contingencies, outage of line 26-30 is identified as the only failure that leads to overload of the
system. According to Tables 1 and 2, the linear and EGR indices for the single outage of line 26-30 are equal
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Figure 6. Linear index for all N − 2 contingencies.
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350

EGR Index
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50
0
26-30 26-30 38-65 38-65 26-30 26-30 26-30 26-30 26-30 .....
25-27 23-25 9-10
8-9 38-65 23-24 22-23 23-22

26-30

.....

38-55 38-65 38-65
44-45 69-75 69-70

Disconnected Lines

Figure 7. EGR index for all N − 2 contingencies.

to 156.61 and 13.35, respectively. The linear and EGR indices for single outage of lines 25-27 and 23-25 do
not exceed the threshold value. However, following cascading outages of lines (26-30, then 25-27) and (26-30,
then 23-25), the EGR index increases to 365 and 251 and the linear index increases to 803.30 and 716.09,
respectively. The deep gap between the indices for N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies demonstrates the perilous
effect of cascading outages. The outages of lines (38-65, then 9-10) and (38-65, then 8-9) are ranked second and
third, respectively. Following the single outage of the mentioned lines the system is not faced with overload
since the linear and EGR indices do not exceed the threshold limit, according to Tables 1 and 2. Except for
the first five failures, others are ranked differently. For the remaining outages, system security is close to line
26-30 outage. As previously mentioned, except line 26-30 failure, other single contingencies do not affect system
security. Therefore, in these contingencies, outage of line 26-30 is the only cause of overload. Considering this
issue and the fact that all demonstrated robustness values indicate overload existence in the system, the ranking
difference is negligible. The failures at the end of the list include two groups: the first group includes one of
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Table 1. Critical line identification regarding system robustness using EGR index.

Disconnected
lines A, B

EGR index for cascading outage of
lines A and B
365
365
159.6
159.6
..
.

EGR index for outage
of line A

EGR index for outage
of line B

Critical line/lines in
cascading outage

13.35>threshold
13.35>threshold
Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold
..
.

Lower
Lower
Lower
Lower
..
.

threshold
threshold
threshold
threshold

26-30,
26-30,
38-65,
38-65,
..
.

26-30, 59-56
26-30, 15-33
..
.

13.36
13.36
..
.

13.35>threshold
13.35>threshold
..
.

Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold
..
.

26-30
26-30
..
.

38-65, 44-45
38-65, 69-75
38-65, 69-70

12.49
12.33
12.12

Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold

Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold

38-65, and 44-45
38-65, and 69-75
38-65, and 69-70

26-30,
26-30,
38-65,
38-65,
..
.

25-27
23-25
9-10
8-9

than
than
than
than

and
and
and
and

25-27
23-25
9-10
8-9

Table 2. Critical line identification regarding system robustness using linear index.

Disconnected
lines A, B

Linear index for
cascading outage of
lines A and B
803.3
716.09
259.27
259.27
..
.

Linear index for outage of line A

Linear index for outage of line B

Critical line/lines in
cascading outage

156.61>threshold
156.61>threshold
Lower than threshold
Lower than threshold
..
.

Lower
Lower
Lower
Lower
..
.

threshold
threshold
threshold
threshold

26-30,
26-30,
38-65,
38-65,
..
.

26-30, 49-50
26-30, 49-54
..
.

156.68
13.36
..
.

156.61>threshold
156.61>threshold
..
.
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lines 38-65, 8-9, or 9-10 outage. As depicted in Figures 4 and 5, since the single outage of lines 38-65, 8-9, or
9-10 increases the system loading level, they are considered as the basic reason for overload in the first group.
The second group includes lines whose single outage does not increase system loading or does not threaten
system security. However, cascading outage of these lines results in overload. This issue shows the importance
of system analysis to identify lines whose cascading outages endanger system security.
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Figure 8. The frequency of the system in normal state and cascading outage of lines 26-30 and 23-25.

3.2. Time domain analysis
In order to verify the ability of the proposed indices in identifying critical contingencies, the sequence of cascading
failures following the worst N −2 contingencies is simulated in DigSILENT PowerFactory. The system frequency
for the normal state and the worst N − 2 contingency is presented in Figure 8. Once lines 26-30 and 23-25
are disconnected at t = 0.5s, the loading of line 25-27 increases to 242.5%. The impedance trajectory of the
relay encroaches into the third zone of the distance relay and leads to outage of the line at t = 1.2s. Once the
line is tripped off, generating units 25 and 26 connected to the rest of the system through lines 26-30 and 25-27
and generating 5% and 7.17% of total generation of the system, respectively, are disconnected. Following these
outages the system is divided into 6 electrical islands. Since there is not sufficient generation within the islands
to meet electricity demand, further generating units are tripped off, leading the islands to blackout. The drop
of the frequency indicates vulnerability of the system to the sequence of mentioned contingencies.
3.3. Critical line identification
Among the critical contingencies, there are a few lines that play a critical role in cascading failures and blackouts.
Percentage of participation is defined as the ratio of failure numbers that each line participates in to the total
failures that lead to cascading failures. The percentage of participation for lines participating in cascading
failures is shown in Figure 9. The lines with percentage of participation lower than 0.5% are not shown.
Accordingly, among all lines, line 26-30 has the greatest percentage of participation and events including line
26-30 lead to the lowest robustness value. Lines 38-65, 8-9, 9-10, and 42-49 are placed in the next stages. The
failures that include line 42-49 outage are located at the end of the failure list and system robustness dose not
decrease as much as for lines 8-9, 9-10, and 38-65. The lines 26-30, 38-65, 8-9, and 9-10 are considered as critical
lines as their failure increases the system loading level and lead the system to cascading outage and blackout
since they have the greatest percentage of participation and system robustness dramatically decreases following
single and cascading outages of these lines. The obtained results from DigSILENT PowerFactory reveal the
accuracy of the proposed indices in identifying critical lines whose failures due to overload lead the power system
to cascading outages and blackout. Apart from identifying the critical lines, the ability to distinguish among
different contingencies is another advantage of the proposed indices.
4. Discussion
This paper presents two indices for power system robustness evaluation in order to identify critical lines whose
outages lead the system to cascading outages and blackout. The most significant advantages of this work are
summarized as follows:
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Figure 9. Percentage of participation of lines participating in failures leading to overload.

• The results of both indices in identifying the events that lead to cascading outage and blackout are in
accordance with each other, according to more than 15,400 simulation results. In other words, although
the linear index is much simpler than the mathematically based EGR index, it is capable of detecting the
critical failures almost as accurately as the EGR index. Hence, the simple linear index is identified as an
accurate and computationally efficient tool to recognize critical lines.
• The conventional methods presented for simulation of cascading outages are based on stochastic approaches
that use complicated approaches for identifying the critical lines. However, the simplicity of the proposed
indices is one of their advantages.
• The linear index is able to recognize even fractional overload in normal and overload states without being
affected by power flow redistribution.
• By applying electrical rules to topological features, the EGR index, a well-known mathematically based
index for evaluating system robustness based on topological features, is able to evaluate power system
robustness.
• Both indices give the same result in ranking the most critical events. However, the remaining events
have different rankings. The difference is ignorable since they have almost the same robustness value that
indicates occurrence of overload in the system.
• The time domain analysis shows the accuracy of the indices in identifying critical lines.
• The percentage of participation reveals that some specific lines have the greatest impact on system
robustness.
• Based on the accuracy and capability of the proposed indices in detection of critical lines, the indices
could be applied to adopt preventive actions against possible cascading outages and blackouts.
5. Conclusion
In this paper two indices have been proposed for power system robustness evaluation in order to identify critical
lines whose failures lead the power system to cascading outage and blackout. The first one is a linear index.
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Parameters of this index are estimated based on two features. The first feature enables the index to identify
even fractional overload. The second feature helps to distinguish between heavily loaded and overloaded states.
The second index is based on graph theory, in which a special weight proportional to the line loading is assigned
to the appropriate element of the related matrix. In this manner, the electrical information is applied to the
topological features. The proposed indices are applied to the 118-bus test system using appropriate threshold
values. The results for N − 1 contingencies indicate that only one contingency jeopardizes system robustness.
However, numerous N − 2 contingencies decrease system robustness beneath the threshold. Analysis of the
results illustrates that there are specific elements in the system whose cascading outage may lead to blackout
although their single outage does not play such a role. On top of that, there are some specific lines that
play critical roles in cascading outages and blackouts. The percentage of participation concept supports this
claim. The results of both indices in identifying the worst N − 1 and N − 2 contingencies are the same. The
percentage of participation reveals that only a small number of lines play critical roles in cascading outages
and blackouts. According to the simulation results, the proposed indices could be used as effective tools for
robustness evaluation and critical line identification in the power system. The drop of the frequency following
the identified critical lines’ outage also supports the ability of the purposed indices. Considering the ability of
the indices in identifying critical lines, the indices could be used by operators to take preventive actions against
possible cascading outages and blackouts.
Nomenclature
RG
LI
Q
∆
W
µi
l
k
Z

Effective graph resistance (EGR)
Linear index
Laplacian matrix
Diagonal matrix
Weighted adjacency matrix
Eigenvalue of Q
Line number
User-defined value in (0, 1)
Absolute of linear equation for S(l) = Smin

a, a′
c, c′
b
Srated
S
L
K
δii

Slopes of linear equations
Intercepts of linear equations
Predefined security margin
Rated power
Apparent powers
Total number of lines
Large positive value (user-defined)
Elements of ∆
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